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The economic and institutional developments of political systems on Western World are
deeply related (North (1990)). One of the reasons explaining this interdependence is the
constitutional state consolidation process. In fact, political systems developments, by con-
solidating the constitutional state, allow greater intensity of trades in markets. Therefore,
we cannot neglect the important role that state has in these developments. In this state
consolidation process, the tax system evolution had an important impact on the political
regime and, consequently, the economic performance.
Moreover, and as North and Wallis (1982) explain, governments have played an im-
portant role in boosting economic activity. In fact, over the last 200 years, and beyond
the reduction costs in the production processes, the public sector has allowed the private
sector to expand by reducing the transaction costs of the markets, enabling, as the authors
say,“individuals to enter into a greater number of exchanges, and thereby encourage spe-
cialization and productivity growth”. Still, the power to tax - a comparative advantage
vis-à-vis the private sector, allowed the state to assume the role of reducing transaction
costs and, therefore, reduced the agency problems.
Since the governments must be financed to implement policies for the improvement
of economic performance, the study of taxation, the tax incidence and the tax systems
composition among countries can give new insights to understand a more general framework
of problems and models of income and wealth coercion. While, on the one hand, the fiscal
state emergence was study comparatively in the long-run (Bonney (1999)), until the XVIII
century, the raise of late modern fiscal systems have not been so reflected. Thus, we
intend to analyse five countries between the XIX and XX centuries, following technical
developments by the state and the raise of fiscal systems, in a historical perspective: the
way of tax structure changes affects economic growth; the impacts of taxation in changing
the economic agents behaviour; collect historical evidence on the practices of tax data
centralization and, consequently, its impact on the efficiency of tax revenues collection; to
study the trade-off between coercion and tax efficiency, analysing the costs of fiscal coercion
and the various levels of public administration; and finally, give new insights about the
role of interest groups on tax structure composition.
Bearing in mind the stated objectives that we intend to study, we compare both tax
systems of France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States, over the last
200 years. The choice of these economies is justified in three important aspects: 1) a
demand for diversity of tax solutions and problems related to it; 2) a relative similarity
in cultural and geographical terms, albeit with diversities of tax histories; 3) the relation
between the scale of the territory and the financing of decision centre’s process.
While the French case is a typical case of the aggregation of different territories, in the
Portuguese case we have a separation of a territorial agglomeration in which the success
of taxation was fundamental to preserve the political viability of the territory. On the
other hand, the cases of the United Kingdom and the United States are an example of a
separation between a colonial ownership (with the successive viability of a new nation) and
a territory confronted with the impacts of heavy losses due to fiscal mismanagement. As
1
for Germany, it is a classic example of unification and fragmentation of decision-making
centres for reasons not necessarily related to economic aspects. This diversity of cases has
allowed to make an exhaustive survey of the extent of economic problems in the field of
taxation.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2 study the tax composition and its effects
on growth, the implications of taxation on economic agent’s behaviour; moreover, section
3 sheds light on the relationship between the tax data centralization and the corresponding
impacts on tax revenues efficiency, and also it addresses the connections between tax coer-
cion and the different degrees of administrative divisions, as also it analyses how interest
groups influence the tax structure; lastly, in section 4, we summarize our conclusions.
2 On the tax composition for the five countries
2.1 The beginning of some tax divergences
In the beginning of the XIX century, the taxes levied on the economy did not evidence
similar patterns among all the countries. In fact, while the proportion of taxes levied on
the French, British and American economies amounted about 10.0%, on average, during
the first fifty years of that century, the revenues of the Portuguese crown were little more
than a third of those economies, in GDP proportion (Bonney (2010),Cardoso and Lains
(2010), Mitchell (1983) and Mitchell (1998)). In fact, the lower proportion of taxes levied
on the Portuguese economy at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and compared to
other countries, deserves some considerations. First, the Portuguese Ancien Régime was
characterized by the non-monopoly of tax coercion by the crown. In fact, some Nobility and
Clergy could tax, evidencing the rentier nature of Portuguese aristocracy, with negative
impact for economic performance (Monteiro (2003)). Moreover, and combining the fact
the most important share of revenues came from the outside of the metropolis, and the
Portuguese economy backwardness had domestic reasons, help to explain the maintenance
of an undeveloped tax system and, at the same time, some resistance for economic reforms
that could help to improve the Portuguese economic development and, consequently to
improve the Portuguese tax system (Amaral (2012)) and Costa et al. (2012)). However,
with the consolidation of the liberal regime, the role of the state in the economy had
grown and this fact had an extreme importance on the development of taxation and the
Portuguese fiscal system during the nineteenth century (Cardoso and Lains (2010) and
Costa et al. (2012)).
In what concerns the taxation composition during the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, tax structures were markedly different among the countries under analysis. On the
one hand, the French tax system was characterized by an avoidance of indirect source of
taxation, influenced by the Physiocratic perspective. It somehow explains, combined with
the political impacts from the French revolution, the majority share was derived from direct
taxation regarding all taxes collected by the French authorities (Shoup (1955)). Moreover,
Willis (1895) has indeed considered that French tax system represented a developed sys-
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tem in this period, in what concerns income taxation. In the beginning of the nineteenth
century 46% of taxes were collected from indirect sources while 49% had origin in direct
taxation, and the remaining share of revenues were part of other sources (Mathias and
O’Brien (1976)).
Regarding the German case1, the data on nineteenth century Prussia show a little more
than 50% of public revenues collected from taxes. Still, between 1800 and 1812, the share
of taxes on public revenues increase its importance by almost 10 p.p. representing in the
latter year 64.7%. In addition, in 1820 it was promoted the introduction a progressive
income tax system without disfavouring the taxation of consumption. Additionally, and
due to a reform of property organization and the cease of feudal dues and services, total
public property income had fallen, with the consequent increase of taxation share on public
revenues, with more share of tax revenues for indirect taxation sources (Mathias and Pollard
(1989)). In short, and according to Mathias and Pollard (1989), Prussian authorities had
in mind two main goals: the promotion of both capital accumulation and economic growth.
In what concerns the taxation on individual income and until the end of the nineteenth
century, the Prussian income taxation was based on the individual social status, with no tax
exemptions for low-income taxpayers. It only changed in 1851, when the Prussian system
levied income taxes based on actual income, becoming socially fairer (Spoerer (2010)).
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese case is characterized
by a pro-cyclical relation between tax revenues and political stability. In fact, and after
the three Napoleonic invasions to Portugal, the Portuguese tax revenues had increased
between 1812 and 1817, with customs amounting between 40% and 50%. Further, in the
first 30 years of that century, Portuguese authorities opted for the indirect taxation via,
which represented between 52% and 65%, despite an also growth in direct taxation, which
varied between 13% and 29% (Silveira (1987)). From 1834 to the end of the first half of the
nineteenth century, the share of direct taxation nearly triples the value of 1834, while the
revenues regarding customs remained practically unchanged, in nominal terms (Cardoso
and Lains (2010)).
In England, the problems related with taxation were debated with regularity since
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In fact, discussions of how taxation could affect both
economic growth and industrialization process, and how to levy taxes after the war against
France (1793 to 1815), were taken not only in the parliament but also in press (Hartwell
(1981)). Actually, there were the wars England was involved in, which represented a factor
to rethink an old tax system that was not elastic enough to give response to collect the
needed revenues to face those wars (O’Brien (1988) and Daunton (2010)).
Yet, the issued debt during the wars against Napoleon crowded out investment and,
consequently, jeopardized economic growth, supporting the necessity for state financing
discussions (Williamson (1984)). Yet, it was recognized by some British people that there
was an unacceptably burdensome tax system, especially during wartime periods (Harling
1Due to a lack of literature, sometimes in this section we will talk only on some important German
territories, highlighting the most significant tax historic episodes on those territories. In that sense, we
refer explicitly what we are referring about when we talk about “Germany”.
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and Mandler (1993)). During the first twelve years of the nineteenth century, the share of
direct and indirect taxation in public revenues amounted to an average of 30% and 70%,
respectively. Moreover, the proportion of direct taxation on output ratio raise from 6%
to 13%, in the same period. After the war against France, more than 75% of government
revenues were collected from customs and excise (Mathias and O’Brien (1976)).
In 1815, the income tax accounted 57% and 21% for direct taxation and total public
revenues, respectively. However, in 1816, the large appeals for the income tax elimination
gain strength and this tax was abolished. In fact, the income tax was so unpopular that
British Parliament sort the complete elimination of all records regarding this tax. Between
the year of 1815 and the end of the first half of XIX century, the indirect taxation was
several reformed. Those reforms, namely the repealing of some taxes whose raised revenue
were considered insignificant and efficiently hard to coerce, and the reduction of tariffs
on some imported goods were carried out in response to the income tax abolition and
the decreasing amount of money spent by the British public authorities. In 1842, with
the reintroduction of the income tax by the Peel’s government, the changes regarding the
disassembly of the indirect sources of taxation were reinforced. This tax philosophy had a
subjacent perspective of a free-trade economy. This economic perspective, jointly with the
alterations in the British tax system allowed raising the British domestic consumption. At
the same time, the external trade developed, raising exports in about of 122% and imports
at approximately 82% (Mathias and Pollard (1989)).
Looking for the American taxation during the first half of the nineteenth century, the
public revenues had origin on import duties and lands sold by the public authorities, with
a little importance of excise and direct taxes. Some political and economic events led
to a change in tax dynamics. There was the case of embargo imposed to England by
Thomas Jefferson, with a consequent decline on import duties revenues and the Panic of
1837 financial crisis, with a consequent decrease of 50% in federal revenues in that year
(Jones and Joulfaian (1991)). The constitutional architecture emerged from the United
States constitutional ratification in 1788 had the effect for indirect taxation preference as
a way to finance public expenditures, without provoke political instability derived by tax
discords related with direct taxation. In fact, the elimination of direct taxes by Thomas
Jefferson, in 1802, demonstrate a clear option for an American economy indirectly taxed.
Furthermore, with an increasing dynamics of industrialization process during the decades
of 1820’s and 1830’s, the property tax had increased its important and raised important
revenues to the government. On other side, the tariffs on imported goods did not always
remain low during the first half of nineteenth century. Actually, the tariffs were reformed
to increase the revenues they provided through the increase in tariffs rates, as it the case
the case of 1812, and as a protection measure against the British competitiveness during
the 1820’s and 1830’s, representing an average value of about 80% between 1830 and 1850
(Brownlee (2004)).
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2.2 A Trade Age and Direct vs. Indirect Tax Frictions
The last fifty years of the nineteenth century, more concretely between 1880 and 1900 in
France, is marked by a great share (between 84% and 81%) of indirect taxes in percentage
of all taxes collected by the French authorities (Morgan and Prasad (2009)). Regarding
international trade tax policy, the tariffs levels in France were constantly lower when com-
pared to the values of the industrial Britain, throughout the majority of nineteenth century
period (Nye (1991)). Furthermore, looking for the foreign trade policy in the last 30 years
of the nineteenth century, Barnes (2011) concludes that the French protectionism justify
the low relative importance of direct taxation in the set of French public revenues. In fact,
direct taxes represented between 22% and 26%, during the period of 1881-1903.
On the other hand, and in the same period, the Prussian tax system was reformed.
Specifically, the land tax was under debate and it culminated with its burden being redis-
tributed differently to what had been until 1861 in order to promote the most industrialized
regions in Prussia (Tilly (1966)). Additionally, the successive reforms of German tax sys-
tem between 1820 and 1873 aimed the capital accumulation and, consequently, the growth
of the economy (Mathias and Pollard (1989)). Between 1872 and 1874, an average of 66.2%
of revenues to finance the German Reich came from taxes and tariffs while 22.7% and 4.4%
had origin in net contributions from the states and public enterprises, respectively (Hefeker
(2001)). At last, between the last decade of the nineteenth and the first decade of twentieth
centuries, while the share of direct taxes on total ordinary revenue increased from 9.9% to
10.4%, we assist a decrease in the indirect tax importance, diminishing from 3.9% to 2.8%
(Mathias and Pollard (1989)). Yet, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, it was
reformed the Prussian income tax in 1891, and its complementary property tax, in 1893.
This tax reform intended to replace an outdated tax system by a new universal taxation
system on income and property promoting, at the same time, a fairer income distribution
through taxation. The tax reforms of these two taxes led to a share of tax burden on the
economic capacity to pay of each individual. Furthermore, once the taxation on capital was
not detrimental to private capital accumulation and, because of that, no exemption was
established for this source of income. Yet, those reforms performed in the late nineteenth
century also had the objective to establish a more efficient and flexible financial regime for
German local authorities (Mathias and Pollard (1989)).
In the second half of XIX century, the Portuguese finances were characterized by an
unsustainable path, which led to a default in 1882. During this period, the Portuguese
economic performance did not converge with some other European countries. The pro-
portion of revenues on GDP were only 1.5 p.p. higher than in 1834. Yet, we assist to a
more pronounced growth of direct and indirect taxation share, while tariffs on trade and
tobacco tax lost their importance of almost 5 p.p., in the last 50 years of the nineteenth
century. Overall, the Portuguese tax revenues growth originated in increases in tax rates
than on tax reforms (Reis (1984), Esteves (2003), Mata and Valério (2003), Esteves (2005)
and Valério et al. (2006)).
On the British case, the proportion of direct and indirect taxes represented, respectively,
30.8% and 69.2% in total revenues, at the beginning of the second half of this century. Until
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the end of the XIX century and the early XX century, the importance of indirect taxation
felt by almost 17 p.p. to 52,4% of total revenue, with a correspondent increasing on direct
taxes, reaching 47.6% in percentage of funds raised by the British governments (Matthew
(1979)). The public finances during the Gladstone period was marked by a laissez-faire
perspective as highlighted by Baysinger and Tollison (1980). ). As the same authors
refer, the Gladstonian public finances were characterized by a minimal state framework
with a consequent reduction in tariffs and the elimination of the income tax. Yet, public
finances period influenced by William Gladstone was characterized by a tax system with
a non-intervention on industry in addition, trade philosophy, but not disregarding the
distribution effects of tax policies. This balance between the reduction of taxation burden
and the poorest individuals in Britain was an important reason popularity of Gladstone,
amongst the taxpayers (Biagini (1991)).
Looking for the American case during the second-half of the nineteenth century, this
period is decisively marked, in what respects taxation, by the introduction, for the first
time, the of income tax in the beginning of the American Civil War (1861-1865), while in
Europe this taxation source was already very common. The introduction of this new tax
reveal to be very important in the United States tax system, representing almost 30% of
total revenues in 1865 (Hill (1894)).
2.3 The Emergence of Income Taxation
In the last century, the French tax historiography is featured by the introduction of a
wartime profits tax, in 1917, to obtain extra revenues to finance the World War I (WWI).
Furthermore, the financial war efforts that relied on taxation represented a few proportion
on the overall costs related to the war – about 16%. In fact, there was a fear feeling
concerning the political stability of the French regime if taxes and tax burden increased on
population (Horn (2000) and Dormois (2004)). During the WWI, the revenues in France
were often constant until the end of the War. Between 1913 and 1918, the taxes, in
proportion of GDP, stagnated around 10%, increasing its value for 14.1% two years after
the end of the war. In addition, due to inflationary pressures and administrative causes,
it was difficult to assess individuals’ real income making it hard to raising income taxes
during the WWI (Hautcoeur (2005)).
In the years preceding WWII, the level of taxation on national income French varied
from 26.9% to 21.3% between the years 1935 and 1938, respectively (Clark (1945)). The
income tax revenues increase 1,011%, from 55.7 to 619.0 thousand of millions of francs,
between 1945 and 1951. In fact, this sharp growth of tax revenues on income is explained in
part by the inflation phenomena. Moreover, and when comparing for the evolution of taxes
on income in thousands of millions of 1938 francs, the real variation of taxes collected only
varied about 100%. Nonetheless, income tax as a proportion of total government revenue
increased from 15% to 28.6%, between 1938 to 1951, reflecting an economic activity increase
after the WWII and an improvement, since 1949, in efficient tax method to collect taxes
on income (Lynch (1997)).
Meanwhile, one year before the beginning of the WWI, the German revenues had the
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following structure: 35.6% was from taxes on income and property; 21.1% had origin on
consumption taxes and 7.0% was levied by transaction taxes while revenues from public en-
terprises, fees, contributions and others accounted for 34.2% (Mathias and Pollard (1989)).
With the start off the WWI, the German state presented some failure degree to tax more
heavily caused by a direct taxation backwardness. This failure to raise more taxes on
individuals had origin in a constitutional limit preventing the Reich to raise revenues from
direct sources. Direct taxes were only assigned to states as an attempt of elites to keep its
control in the new industrialization process of the German nation (Witt (1987)). At the
end of WWI, Germany’s tax system was considered ineffective for the post-war period, as
its structure did not have sufficient capacity to pay interest on debt through its current
revenues (Kuczynski (1923)). After the WWI, the tax reform policies introduced in 1920,
it was possible to stabilize the price level consistent with the levels of German debt (Webb
(1986)).
During the Great Depression, the behaviour of German governments was considered
restrictive in establishing the fiscal policies. Only with the ascent of Hitler to chancellor
of the Reich, the Nazi governments implement a set of expansionary fiscal policies leading
to a fast economic recovery when compared to other economies. In terms of tax policies,
the Nazis only reduced some tax rates in 1933. Although, later the taxes were increased,
but the combined tax changes are considered as having low impact on German fiscal policy
(Cohn (1992)). From the year of 1920 to 1930, the Reich revenues decreased from 22.6%
to 12.5% of Net Nominal Product (Sommariva and Tullio (1987)).
During all the twentieth century, the Portuguese economy remain the poorest country
in the set of all countries in analysis. The Portuguese income per individual represented
only 47% of Gross National Product per capita relatively a set of countries (Reis (1984)).
Similarly, to the last half of the nineteenth century, the first decade of XX century is
characterized by an unsustainable pattern of public finances (do Rosario Correia et al.
(2008)). As mentioned by Franco (1982), the public revenues are characterized by an
indirect taxation predominance, mainly based in tariffs, consumption and stamp taxes in
the beginning of the century. This fact was accompanied with structural failures in direct
taxation incidence. As the author stresses the direct taxation system remain similar to the
tax reform operated by Mouzinho da Silva, almost one century ago, which is in line with the
notion of an archaic tax system. Furthermore, during the First Portuguese Republic regime
(1910-1926), the amount of taxes collected between 1914 and 1920 represented a decrease
in tax-to-GDP ratio, jeopardizing the Portuguese fiscal sustainability, with a recovery in
that sustainability in the end of the regime (Ferraz and Duarte (2014)). Although, from
the beginning of the First Republic period to the end of the first half of twentieth century,
the share of tax revenues on the Portuguese GDP declines from 11.2% to 6,7%. Yet,
and during this period, the conveyancing tax revenues on GDP, as well as direct taxation
proportion on economic activity, kept stable proportions (Lopes (2005)).
In the beginning of twentieth century, the rise of the British state role on the econ-
omy was concerned primarily with the taxpayer’s interests, instead of increase of public
expenditures. This means that the British taxation structure was more important than
the proportion of taxes levied on proportion of national income (Daunton (1996b)).
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The period coincident with the WWI, the government revenues varied, in percentage
of net receipts, between 19.3% and 30.5% between the fiscal year of 1914/15 and 1918/19.
There was a political consensus on the direct taxation policies and both parties had a
pragmatic perspective on this source of taxation. For reasons of deflation phenomena
afraid in the beginning of the WWI, the British authorities had some caution in raising
taxes. Because of this perspective, taxes represented less than one third of total government
income between the fiscal years of 1914/15 until 1918/19. The other revenues raised by the
British governments came from contributions from British colonies and borrowing. The
capacity of borrowing by Britain was a signal of the best-developed financial system in
Europe in the beginning of twentieth century (Daunton (1996b)). In addition, the income
tax represented almost 30% in 1913/14, while customs and duties saw their importance
reduced from the values rounding the 22.5% of all revenues receipted by the Exchequer
for almost 15%. Furthermore, between the WWI start until 1929/30, the direct taxation
significance regarding total revenues raised from 57.5% (1913/14) to 64.2% (1929/30),
translating in a decreasing importance of indirect taxation (Daunton (2002)).
After the WWI until the years preceding the beginning of the Second World War
(WWII), the tax amounts collected by the British authorities’ increase, in terms of British
income, from 11.2%, in 1913, to 21.9%, in 1937 (Clark (1945)). Between the two world wars,
due to the increase in the burden taxation after the WWI and the large interest payments
to individuals holding public debt and the increased demanding for welfare expenditures
by the citizens put some pressure on the political consensus and could lead to a lack of
legitimacy of British constitutional state. To deal with equilibrium between both sides, the
level of taxation has increased to allow the British state to fulfil its financial obligations
and enlarge some social spending. That grew in the taxation on national income enabled
some social equity without hampering the British financial system (Daunton (1996a)).
During the World War II (WWII), the proportion of taxes levied reached 44.7% of
British national income in 1944, being 25.2% in the year before WWII, that is, 1938. In
the end of the WWII, the income and super taxes represented 44.9% while Customs and
Excise together and excess profits tax amounted 34.7% and 14.5%, respectively, in the
total of revenues receipted by the Exchequer (Daunton (2002)).
The early twentieth century American tax history is characterized by a large proportion
of custom duties and taxes on both tobacco and alcohol on total federal revenues (84%).
However, the share of these taxes has decreased to 25%, and, consequently, another taxes
as the income tax represented the majority quota in the federal revenues, amounting 59%
in the year of 1930 (Mehrotra (2013)). On the other hand, the WWI had a tremendous
impact in the American tax system. In fact, it was during the WWI that income tax became
permanent, structurally changing the American government revenues (Saldin (2010)).
With the 1929’s financial crash and the consequent Great Depression, taxes were raised
to finance the New Deal program. Consequently, the tax base extension increased the
taxpayer numbers in 500 thousand individuals. In the same way, in 1935, a new set of taxes,
as were the cases of gift, inheritance, were launched, and, on the other hand, a surtax on
individual income was adopted. However, the revenues extracted from the new tax policy
seemed to be in vain (Markham (2002)). With the WWII, United States had the necessity
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to finance the war while facing the end period of the Great Depression. Therefore, during
the Roosevelt’s administration, it was imposed a tax of a 50% rate on excessive profits -
afterwards this tax rate reached 90% - and, in order to prevent inflationary pressures, it
was reduced the income tax exemptions. With those tax impositions, the income tax share
amounted 40% of all federal revenues, while tax base has widened for a total of 42.6 million
taxpayers in 1945, when it stood at 3.9 million in 1939 (Brownlee (2004)).
2.4 Between tax progressivity and tax cuts
In the last 50 years of the last century, the French taxation system is considered to
be the most developed and, at the same time, the most economically neutral tax system
regarding indirect taxation, when compared to western countries (Shoup (1957)). In fact,
the revenues provided to French authorities with the value-added tax (VAT) accounted one-
third for the total public revenues collection, and it proved to be the most stable tax, both
in political and economic terms, of the late 50 years of French tax history (Dormois (2004)).
In fact, until the introduction of VAT in 1954, the tax on production was focused on final
producer, but, due to the necessity to funds to finance public spending, the introduction
of VAT emerged. The creation of VAT also allowed dividing the tax payments for all
the chain of value, and reducing the tax burden on final producer (Shoup (1955)). The
proportion of indirect taxes on GDP only increased 0.6 p.p. in 30 years, i.e., between
1970 and 1999, being in the later year 15.6%. The important point to highlight regarding
to changes in indirect taxation took place in the 1970’s, with the loss of importance of
taxes on general sales, offset by the increased importance of VAT. In what respects direct
taxation, this source of taxation has increased more significantly from 1975 until the end
of the century (7.4% to 9.2% in percentage of GDP). Although, the dynamics of direct
taxation was not constant, which is explained by factors as economic growth performance,
the increasing progressivity degree of individual income tax, with the consequent decrease
in income and capital inequalities degree, as well as the increase above economic growth
of firms profits in France during the last 30 years of the twentieth century (Bernardi and
Profeta (2004) and Piketty (2007)). Still, in 1980, the taxation structure composed by
the individual tax, corporate tax, property and general sales tax represented 12%, 5%,
3% and 22%, respectively, of government revenues, and 41% on the French economy (Alt
(1983)). In conclusion, in the last 30 years, the French tax history was marked by a
declined in indirect taxation share, although it remained the most important source for
French public revenues, the tax on income provided from labour represented almost three
times the capital tax burden, illustrating the political tax options over the last decades in
France (Bernardi and Profeta (2004)).
As for the German case, and after it defeat in WWII, the German territory was divided
between the Federal Republic of Germany (commonly known as West Germany), occupied
by United States, United Kingdom and France, and the German Democratic Republic (also
referred as East Germany), under control of the Soviet Union2. . Since the 1950’s decade,
2Onwards, we will address only the West Germany case until the reunification process.
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the main source of the German state revenues was levied on personal incomes, including
social security contributions). Between 1955 and 1979 the shares of taxes regarding GDP
had increased 6.5 p.p. to 37.3% in 1979. The dynamic of tax revenues expresses the several
tax policies reform taken after the WWII. With the occupation of the West German by
the Allied Control Council, it was implemented several tax reforms to face the needs of
German reconstruction, the economic recession of 1970’s and the occupation itself of the
Allies3. During this occupation it was introduced and raised personal income (up to 90%)
and corporation (up to 60%) tax rates. However, with the end of the reconstruction period
and the improvement of the German economic situation, the taxes were lowered in 1970’s
(King and Fullerton (1984)).
From the 1970’s to the end of the twentieth century, the tax revenues, in proportion of
GDP, grew from 19.2% to 24.4%. Both direct and indirect taxes shared equal proportion
on GDP in 1999 (12.2%). The VAT tax revenues is, during this period, the main source of
collected revenues via indirect source. When compared to the European average values, the
tax raised by the German authorities was constantly lower. The gap between German taxes
and the European average is due to VAT taxes which were always lower than European
mean. Lastly, and during the 1990’s, there were not substantial tax reforms in Germany,
keeping a high statutory and narrow basis. In the beginning of the last decade of the
twentieth century, it was introduced some taxes to finance the process of reunification
between the West and East Germany (Maffini (2004)).
On the other hand, and with the coup d’état of 25th April and the consequent process
of democratization, the necessity of fiscal modernization was imperative. The adoption of
a western capitalist constitution as expressed by Franco (1982) and the will of Portugal
to make part of European Economic Community (ECC) had impact on the Portuguese
tax system improvement. From the beginning of democratic period in Portugal, the share
of revenues on GDP rose roughly 12 p.p. to 22.30% in 1997. In addition, it is possible
to observe the political choice by the increasing of direct taxation. On the other hand,
the indirect taxation importance remained (Lopes (2005)). Moreover, it is clear the differ-
ence between direct and indirect taxation between Portugal and the remaining countries
in European Union. First, the Portuguese economy taxed less than the other European
partners, in proportion of GDP did. Secondly, and contrarily to Portugal, the European
countries opted to raise revenues mostly from directed sources. Nevertheless, as the data
presented in Porto (1985), the direct and indirect shares of taxation converged between the
years of 1977 and 1984. As Lopes (2005) refers, some causes related with the decreasing
proportion of direct taxation in the post-25th April period are the reduction of tax on
agricultural property and with the diminishing amount of tax on industrial activity caused
by changes in tax base. Those changes were provoked in part by the weakness of Por-
tuguese institutions and with the tumultuous events originated in the transition process
to democracy.
During that period, the tax effort increases significantly, raising the level of discontent
3Since we are analysing the West German case, when we refer to Allies we are referring United States,
United Kingdom and France.
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of taxpayers. Therefore, a tax reform which to excel for a greater sense of tax justice, in an
economic rationality framework and to fight tax evasion was mandatory (Sousa (2012)).
Therefore, a major tax reform was carried out in 1980 decade. In fact, the 1988’s tax
reform established two taxes, IRS and IRC, which addressed on individual income and
firms profit, respectively. In this tax changes, the Portuguese authorities opted to tax the
real income, instead of the presumed one. Another important tax introduced in this period
and responsible an important share of revenues, was the introduction of a value-added tax
(IVA) which was focus on spending, highlighting the fact of being a tax on real income.
However, as Lopes (2005) criticizes, the reform was not totally completed, keeping different
tax rates according to the income sources. Consequently, and with the taxation on real
income, the events related with tax evasions emerged in a higher degree.
After the WWII and the last 50 years of the twentieth century, the British tax revenues
rounded the value of 40% of GDP. Between the end of the WWII until 1960, tax revenues
dynamics was characterized by a decreasing movement while during the 1960’s, the burden
of taxation has risen constantly. Between the 1970 and the end of the twentieth century, the
taxes collected by the British government did not present a regular pattern. The British tax
system, the second half of twentieth century is defined by a little decrease on the importance
share of income and wealth taxes, declining from almost 45%, in the post-WWII period,
to 38.9%, in 1980, increasing its importance to 42% in the year of 2000. When observed
the direct source of taxation, the income and wealth taxes represented more than a half
of taxation levied in Britain during the last 50 years of the last century. When looking to
the income tax evolution during the second half of the previous century, the 1973/4 reform
there was an increasing on top rate on earnings from 75% to 83% but rapidly was cut to
60% and 40% in 1979 and 1988, respectively, as well as the basic rate which decreased from
35% to 22% between 1977 to 2000. To compensate those reductions on tax rates, several
allowances were eliminated. Those reforms explain somehow the relative importance kept
by the taxes on capital and income over the eighties. Furthermore, and regarding the
indirect taxation, the value added tax (VAT), introduced in 1973 - a tax implementation
requested to be part of the European Economic Community (ECC) - represented the most
important increase in its importance of tax revenues in the latter 30 years, while excise
duties lost some importance in the late 50 years (Clark and Dilnot (2002)).
Lastly, in 1948, the United States signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) cutting off some tariffs and other restrictions, favouring international trade and
reducing the level of protectionism. In percentage of GDP, the proportion of revenues
extracted from the United States economy varied between those the 1948-1995 period,
from 22.7% to 36.2% (Fishback (2007)).
Between the WWII and the 1970’s, the American government size increased significantly
as a result of a greater need for regulation of the economy to avoid further crises arisen
from the free market economy, thus replacing the existing economy by a modern mixed
economy (Walton and Rockoff (2009)). In what respects the tax composition, the share of
individual income tax on the United States revenues evidenced a relative stable path only
challenged by war or inflation phenomena. In 1960, the federal income tax was essentially a
flat tax rate between 20% and 22%, becoming a more progressive only in the end of 1970’s
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(Bakija and Steuerle (1991)). The president Kennedy, and his successor Johnson, had
paid particular attention to the poverty phenomenon, and to deal with it, social spending
programs were created, as were the cases of Medicare and Medicaid, being financed by a
cut on taxes and by a set of progressive tax reforms (Brauer (1982)). Furthermore, and
despite the political discussions around how to finance those social programs, the payroll
tax rates were increased to get more revenues to balance the social program budgets.
The late 1970’s period was marked by some tax discontent feelings. In fact, contrary
to the continuous tax cuts, the real tax burdens increased constantly during the 1970
decade provoked by the combining factors of inflation and increasing in some marginal tax
rates (Shaviro (1990)). During the 1980’s, period under the liberal panorama of Reagan’s
administration, there was a perspective, as explained in Fullerton et al. (1994), of a tax
policy by the supply-side of the economy. That perspective had, as consequence, the
decrease of taxation to favour economic growth, as demonstrated by the tax philosophy of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The reduction
in taxes came inevitability with a reduction of almost 20 p.p. in the top federal marginal
income tax, increasing the regressive degree of the income tax (Kasten et al. (1996)).
Therefore, a significant tax reform was carried out in 1986, with the purpose of reduc-
ing the tax rates. One important feature of this tax reform was the implementation of
a comprehensive income taxation with support of both parties in the American congress
and, equally, the president Ronald Reagan. According to Pechman (1987), this tax reform
improved the United States tax system fairness and, at the same time, reduced the dis-
tortional behaviours that the old system induced in the American economy. However, on
the other hand, this reform jeopardized the firms, provoking an increase in corporate taxes
through the investment credit elimination and reduced a considerable set of capital cost
allowances, provoking a reduction in investment and an increasing to the cost of capital.
During the 1990’s, some taxes increased its share regarding the federal revenues, in
special, individual and corporate income taxes grew more than 5 p.p. while social security
revenues, excise taxes and other receipts reduced its importance in the United States tax
revenues. Under the Bill Clinton presidency, two tax reforms were carried out the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act, in 1993, and Taxpayer Relief Act, in 1997. The first tax reform
raised the income tax rates from 36% to 39.6% for individuals of higher earnings and several
taxes on firms, on fuels and on social security were raised while some tax exemptions were
reduced or even eliminated. On other hand, the latter tax reform was characterized by
a tax reduction in some federal taxes, as the reduction of 8 p.p. in the capital gains tax
(Schick (2007)). Lastly, in the opinion of Martin Feldstein, in Elmendorf et al. (2002) , it
was clear that the Clinton tax policies did not change significantly the American taxation
system. The raise of marginal tax rates increased significantly as the inefficiency and the
deadweight of the United States tax system.
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3 Centralizing tax data and revenues collection effi-
ciency: There is a mutual gain?
Beyond the tax composition and several tax incidences, the multiple administrative
divisions of the territory as well as the taxation administrative procedures centralization,
besides the power of the various pressure groups, can have a serious impact on the col-
lection of tax revenues. Moreover, the efficiency degree related to the costs of coercion
also evidence an important feature in collecting the same revenue. Specifically, the non-
standardization of procedures related to taxation, could seriously affect the income and
wealth. In fact, tax regionalization and non-uniform procedures could give more access
to economic opportunities to those who can spend time and resources to get advantage
from a non-unified tax system. However, it also could be beneficial to have ad-hoc tax
procedures for the regions, in an economy, which behaves differently from the average
economic behaviour. For those reasons, we think to be important to explore the many
features regarding the tax centralization procedures, as well as the impact of possible tax
effects differentiated due to territory divisions. In addition, we also intend to understand
the impact of groups of interests in the existing tax decision-making along both nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. In this section we have chosen to do an individual analysis of
each country, since the data available in the literature on these issues are not very abun-
dant. This is why tax efficiency remains a central topic neglected by the economists since
the administrative data is not so easy to treat. Either by methodological bias regarding
bureaucracy analysis a higher degree of data dispersion and difficulty in handling large
amounts of data. Therefore, it is understandable that we cannot analyse these topics in a
temporal perspective as in the previous section.
The French tax historiography during the last 200 years was marked by the introduc-
tion by Nicolas-François Mollien and Charles-Louis Gaston of double-entry bookkeeping
accountability system in 1815 to provide transparency on public budgets. The implemen-
tation of that mechanism was due to the need of the French kingdom in controlling the
activity carried out by financiers, which were private entities responsible for funds col-
lection to the crown. During the first-half of the French nineteenth century tax history,
the doubly-entry methods proved to be a solid method and was never truly challenged by
other existing methodology (Nikitin (2001)). Moreover, during the nineteenth century, the
French system was reformed to avoid the arbitrariness of the Ancien Régime tax incidence,
assessing it by a verifiable criterion, that is, with a low operation costs, and respecting the
rights of the taxpayer (Shoup (1955)). Until the first half of the nineteenth century, there is
evidences highlighting the role of French rentier social classes and their excessive represen-
tation in parliament pressing for indirect taxes to be preferred over direct taxes (Bonney
(2010)).
On the other hand, when we look for the centralization process in tax collections, the
French tax system started the concentration procedure of tax administration along the
first half of nineteenth century, first via a central bureaucratization of indirect source of
taxation, in 1804, and other taxes, including customs, in the years of 1814, 1816 and
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1852. Yet, it was clear that the bureaucratization and the increase in the power to coerce
degree explain the reduction costs in tax enforcement, reducing them from 28% to 9%,
in comparison to gross revenues, between 1823 and 1900. On the other hand, when we
look for the centralization process in tax collections, the French tax system started the
concentration procedure of tax administration along the first half of nineteenth century,
first via a central bureaucratization of indirect source of taxation, in 1804, and other
taxes, including customs, in the years of 1814, 1816 and 1852. Yet, it was clear that the
bureaucratization and the increase in the power to coerce degree explain the reduction
of costs in tax enforcement, reducing the costs from 28% to 9%, in comparison to gross
revenues, between 1823 and 1900. Furthermore, it was clear that the process of slower pace
of bureaucratic and centralization of direct tax collections were due to the large extent of
French territory, coinciding with the weak development of roads, while French economic
activity did not present a booming trajectory (Kiser and Kane (2001)).
Looking for tax administration in France, the structure of tax administration remained
practically unchanged until the World War I (WWI), contributing for an efficient tax
management. From the French revolution until the mid-twentieth century, there were
four administrative divisions responsible direct taxes, indirect taxes, customs, and stamp
taxes, respectively, with little evidence of data exchange between those tax administra-
tions (Shoup (1955)). In addition, during the first half of the twentieth century some
lobby groups intended to repel some tax measures, as was the case of the undeveloped
French agrarian sector and other economic groups which caused numerous resistances on
the application of income taxation, and appealing for the government to opt for tariffs to
finance public government.
As for the phenomenon of tax evasion, early in the second half of the twentieth century,
this was relatively tolerated by the tax authorities. There was, at the time, the notion that,
regardless of the behaviour of taxpayers in tax compliance, lack of revenue would force the
government to increase the level of both taxes and coercion on individuals (Shoup (1957)).
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Prussia was characterized by the most
efficient tax system in Europe. Some features as an effective tax system controlled by
politicians, an efficient inspection scheme on tax officials and a long-term agreement on
tax farming over the domains, beyond a political stability, may contribute, according to
Kiser and Schneider (1994), for the highest efficiency degree of the Prussian tax system
between 1640 and 1806. However, there was also intentions to repeal some taxes. In fact, in
1811 a 5% marginal tax rate on income is introduced in Germany provoking many protests
among the wealthiest individuals, accusing the state of meddling in the private sphere,
evoking, at the same time, the destruction of their property rights. Nine years later, in
1820 it was introduced a class tax, a mix of poll and income taxes contributing, with the set
of existing indirect taxes, to increase the income and wealth inequalities (Kitchen (2006)).
On the other hand, the division of the German territory in multiple states evidence
of non-sharing for the same tax features. in what concerns public finances, namely the
taxation incidence. While southern states opt to tax land and businesses, following the
French case, the Prussian territory choose to base its taxation on individuals. Other
territories, with little administration control, chose the indirect via. Until the Napoleonic
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Wars, Germany did not possess a system of records of taxes and expenditure. During the
French occupation, the public finance system in Germany was reformed. A periodic budget
had to be elaborated, enforced and controlling the enforcement degree, with no exception
for the most territories (Spoerer (2010)).
In the year of 1834, an agreement between German states to manage customs barriers
originated the German Customs Union or Zollverein. Institutionally, Zollverein was con-
sisted of a congress composed by representative members of each state making decisions
on tariff rates among other questions related with the mechanism of the custom union.
The final decision required a unanimous decision between the member states to change or
to implement policies. There was only a small and permanent office in Berlin responsible
to manage the revenues between the German member states. Almost 40 years from the
establishment of Zollverein, German territories were unified and, at the same time, domi-
nated by Prussia. However, as a counterpart to the integration into the German empire,
the southern territories were allowed to continue to levy taxes on beer and liquor. The
revenues intended to the Reich had come from indirect taxes beyond the revenues provided
for its monopolies (Ploeckl (2010)). Moreover, in 1913, and taking into account the admin-
istrative division of Germany, the Reich raised 30.0% of taxes while the German states and
local territories totalled 30.6% and 39.4% of all public revenues collected in 1913 (Mathias
and Pollard (1989)).
The Portuguese tax history in the first half of nineteenth century, and in what respect to
tax administrative evolution is characterized by an evolution with the objective of efficiency
increasing, with the adoption of modern fiscal and tax rules (Esteves (2005)). Yet, and
during this period, with the objective of raising fiscal revenues and with the improvement of
public administration efficiency, some tax reforms were implemented by the Costa Cabral
governments, as were the case of the implementation of a new circulation tax and a reform in
décima tax which originated a tax on production, and another based on individual income.
Although these tax reforms proved to be fruitless, with some tax revolts events, as were the
case of Maria da Fonte revolt (Hespanha (2004) and de Macedo et al. (2006)). Moreover,
the ministry of finance Henrique de Barros Gomes tried to implement a progressive tax,
in 1880. This attempt of tax reform was partially sinker by the opposition. However, and
because the financial crisis of the end of the century, this tax became the most important
source of direct taxation (Esteves (2005)).
In the last 50 years of nineteenth century, there were significant efforts to raise a
modern tax administration, with the consequent geographical delimitation of taxation,
corresponding to the attempt to fiscal state modernization by liberals in Portugal (Sousa
(2012)). )). Attempts to modernize the state of taxation, however, were not peaceful, and
there were several popular protests against the creation of some taxes and their incidence
(Cerezales (2007)).
During the Portuguese dictatorship, it was presented a new proposal for a tax system
with the purpose of raising at least the same amount of tax revenues as before, with a
consequent increase the taxation efficiency degree, while the authorities intended to avoid
double taxation phenomena. Yet, it was clear the authorities’ intention to tax only from
certain thresholds depending on the geographical area where the taxpayers lived. Therefore,
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some of the measures proposed by this commission were neglected, with fear of political
instability, and in 1928, were implemented progressive personal income tax based on income
ranges for public servants, there was a reduction in capital tax rate when applied in foreign
assets and the individual tax income was replaced by a complementary tax. In the same
year, the ad valorem municipal taxes were abolished. Those implemented tax measures
were an attempt to satisfy who criticize the tax reform occurred in 1922, but, however,
this reform was accompanied by a raise in tax effort, although the elimination of income
and transaction taxes with this tax changes (Valério et al. (2006)).
One of the hallmarks that characterized the Portuguese tax system over the last 150
years was the fact that only in 2011 the several institutions responsible for taxation converge
into one, the Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira (Sousa (2012)).
The year of 1803 is marked, in the context of the British tax system, by a centralization
of the income tax (Kiser and Kane (2001)). Beside this, in the beginning of the XIX
century, the improvement in the efficiency degree of tax administration, combined with
some tolerance on tax evasion phenomena, and a focused tax design to extract the necessary
extra amount of public revenues on specific set of goods and social groups characterize the
British tax system in the early XIX century (O’Brien (1988)). Moreover, when Addington
became prime-minister, his government reformed the tax system established in Pitt’s era,
splitting the income tax returns into five separate ones. With this reform, Addington
managed to reduce the degree of dissatisfaction with the taxation imposed on British
taxpayers, with the consequent trade-off of a certain degree of tax evasion.
Lastly, and during WWII in Britain, the tax payment schedules were reformed allowing
the taxes to be paid in a weekly or monthly periods. Yet, the tax reform of 1942 gave some
protection to over/under payments on income tax due to an assessment of actual earnings
by taxpayers in a weekly basis, instead of what happened before, in which tax deductions
were set on past earnings.
In what respects the United States case, we can split the American tax administration
history in three periods: 1790-1842, the 1840’s until the WWII and the final one relies
between WWII and the end of the twentieth century. These three distinct periods high-
light the relative importance of the various levels of government in public finances history
in the United States, which suggests a relationship between the structures of revenue and
government. Yet, during the first stage of the American public finance system, the state
governments benefited from a context of lower costs regarding its financing when com-
pared with the other levels of government, allowing for the development and creation of
businesses with financial returns via dividends, fees and indirect taxes. The second stage
of the American public finance dynamics the local government increase its importance
with the decline on asset finance era, yielding a set of infrastructures carried out by local
governments. To finance these local government expenditures, the property taxes played
the most important role and dominated the share of all government revenues. The last
era of the United States finances began with the Great Depression and the subsequent
New Deal. After this economic crisis, the fiscal importance of national government in-
creased significantly, where the federal government centralized the revenues collection, due
to its comparative advantage compared to other governments degrees, and decentralized
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the public spending among all government levels. During this last period, the income tax
raised its importance, with a consequent decline in property taxes share in tax revenues
(Wallis (2000)).
4 Conclusions
In this essay we analysed the tax history of France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom
and United States in the last two centuries. Usually, tax problems are analysed as we can
clearly distinct between political processes, tax decisions and the taxpayers. The problem
is that some taxpayers can influence the bureaucratic decision-makers, when they are not
precisely the same individuals (Brennan and Buchanan (2000)).
In order to avoid these generalizations, the historical data presented in the present
essay highlights the mechanisms between tax burden composition, the tax administration
and the political system.
First, the groups of interest seem to have forced a tax composition favouring indirect
taxes: France throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Prussia in the
nineteenth century, Portugal during the 200 years under analysis, and the United Kingdom
and the United States in the second half of the 19th century, as can be observed in both
tables 1 and 2.
The reversal of this process in the case of the United Kingdom and the United States
throughout the twentieth century is obviously linked to the frank broadening of the elec-
toral recruitment base of parliaments and chambers of representatives, which explains the
emergence of constitutional analyses of the fiscal process, with greater sophistication, in
these two countries (Hayek (2011)). It is clear, furthermore, that this oscillation between
non-parliamentary systems and preponderance for indirect taxes, and on the other hand,
parliamentary systems and predominance by direct taxes is influenced by other factors.
Above all, the costs of coercion (and its inevitable pressure on tax revenue) and how to
ease the payment of taxes (through payments in instalments such as the second half of the
twentieth century in the UK, for example) can affect the taxpayer’s perception about the
fairness of tax systems.
The costs of coercion are clearly a decisive element and little studied. However, the
data collected show that the reduction of operating costs was a decisive factor in the
construction of tax systems. In our study, we identified four factors that explain the
reduction of these costs with obvious consequences on the tax burden perception: efficiency
in the calculation of taxes and accounting of revenues, transparency of these processes,
control of fiscal officials, and centralization of taxation offices. It seems evident that these
factors are decisive in explaining, for example, the difficulties of economic performance and
redistribution of income as is the case of Portugal during the twentieth century.
Other decisive factors, but in need of complementary studies, are the importance of
technological factors in the efficiency of tax systems, such as the development of terrestrial
roads, through transport systems (implying information costs in analogical systems), or
the capacity of information communication systems, namely modern digital processes.
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Knowledge of these developments will make it possible to rigorously assess the use of
regional economies of scale in order to increase the efficiency of tax systems over the last
two centuries.
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Table 1: Tax structure by country in percentage of total revenues, 1800-1990.
Customs Excise Indirect taxes Direct taxes
FR DE PT GB US FR DE GB US FR DE PT GB US FR DE PT GB US
1800 21.48 82.73 33.54 7.27 30.41
1810 19.18 91.49 36.99 28.77
1820 20.00 83.33 50.00 0.56 13.33
1830 35.19 88.00 37.04 9.26
1840 40.49 44.23 73.68 28.85 39.54 25.43 19.97 7.69
1850 9.87 38.60 90.91 26.32 23.21 17.54
1860 7.84 40.96 32.86 94.64 27.14 30.56 17.48 28.47 20.00
1870 4.93 32.05 29.41 47.45 16.61 33.82 32.04 45.01 37.85 35.89 13.24
1880 8.86 55.78 40.37 23.17 55.99 20.80 39.80 30.49 27.51 37.13 32.16 32.11 15.85
1890 10.99 55.67 43.42 20.62 57.07 18.95 38.88 29.90 31.9 35.48 31.62 24.69 16.49
1900 10.88 52.54 33.27 19.29 41.09 17.51 38.44 27.14 31.96 52.03 28.76 34.77 20.71
1910 13.71 44.23 30.92 16.18 49.41 15.09 36.56 19.61 35.73 42.90 29.87 33.38 32.35
1920 8.51 4.08 30.58 9.40 4.86 8.39 16.96 14.03 12.15 7.81 9.4 31.89 20.60 21.1 37.53 43.20
1930 12.09 16.32 38.53 14.10 14.47 13.86 29.85 14.45 13.92 17.21 15.01 21.5 30.34 48.4 39.96 38.11 59.39
1940 11.19 5.19 29.39 20.40 4.81 8.03 20.49 14.98 27.40 25.30 14.43 24.47 23.11 52.21 46.15 46.56 43.08
1950 7.23 3.73 27.87 21.77 0.99 2.31 18.63 17.44 18.44 35.89 29.81 29.49 31.11 32.92 42.64 47.46 74.70
1960 11.61 4.97 31.27 22.95 1.20 1.77 14.56 14.71 13.04 31.61 28.24 27.03 37.26 41.39 41.72 45.49 83.69
1970 8.23 2.12 17.53 1.24 4.34 15.99 29.72 8.29 41.03 27.81 42.87 34.17 43.65 33.26 48.60 87.05
1980 7.57 1.40 6.28 1.39 2.63 11.82 16.62 4.64 40.49 28.39 58.63 16.62 39.79 51.67 35.09 44.56 90.33
1990 8.39 1.31 1.15 1.65 2.42 11.98 16.81 3.39 44.80 26.73 60.58 21.18 43.70 44.36 38.27 54.58 91.27
For France, Germany and United Kingdom the results are computed by using the data from Mitchell (1998), for Portugal from Valério et al. (2006) and for the United
States the presented results was constructed based on Mitchell (2007) statistics.
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Table 2: Tax revenues in proportion of GDP, and average per capita GDP growth rate by country and per decade,
1800-1990.
France Germany Portugal United Kingdom United States
Taxes Change (p.p.) GDPpc Taxes Change (p.p.) GDPpc Taxes Change (p.p.) GDPpc Taxes Change (p.p.) GDPpc Taxes Change (p.p.) GDPpc
1800 5.77
1810 0.40 9.35 3.58 0.68
1820 10.41 -0.51 10.21 0.86 -0.19
1830 8.50 -1.90 0.48 12.27 0.71 9.32 -0.89 1.28
1840 8.61 0.11 1.81 3.55 10.20 -2.08 1.24 11.12 1.80 0.88
1850 9.08 0.47 1.12 10.67 0.48 -0.79 10.79 -0.34 0.90
1860 8.33 -0.76 1.70 1.38 3.43 9.20 -1.48 1.94 11.33 0.54 1.92
1870 6.94 -1.39 -0.09 1.15 3.49 0.05 6.30 -2.90 1.20 10.54 -0.79 0.87
1880 11.64 4.70 1.23 1.74 0.80 3.82 0.33 -0.29 6.32 0.02 0.86 9.26 -1.28 2.64
1890 11.16 -0.48 1.14 2.79 1.05 1.98 4.68 0.85 1.74 7.06 0.74 1.42 10.91 1.65 0.63
1900 11.63 0.47 1.91 2.73 -0.06 2.07 4.85 0.18 1.44 7.80 0.74 1.14 11.13 0.22 1.87
1910 10.45 -1.18 0.31 3.27 0.54 1.15 5.98 1.12 -0.59 9.94 2.14 0.26 8.92 -2.21 1.93
1920 12.83 2.38 0.85 -1.80 3.50 -2.47 0.01 23.89 13.94 -0.14 9.31 0.39 1.12
1930 15.20 2.37 3.40 9.23 3.52 7.51 4.01 2.45 20.29 -3.59 1.79 11.51 2.20 1.12
1940 -1.14 3.07 7.06 -0.45 0.28 22.25 1.96 2.31 15.37 3.86 1.21
1950 2.49 16.46 -3.31 7.58 0.52 2.56 36.46 14.21 0.12 20.63 5.26 3.10
1960 20.88 3.55 18.58 2.12 6.86 8.17 0.58 3.48 28.07 -8.39 2.20 26.53 5.90 1.70
1970 22.35 1.47 4.33 20.18 1.60 3.41 10.84 2.67 6.16 35.84 7.77 2.20 26.69 0.16 2.83
1980 23.04 0.69 2.58 22.24 2.07 2.64 13.06 2.23 3.85 32.94 -2.91 1.83 27.69 1.00 2.12
1990 21.43 -1.61 1.78 22.47 0.22 1.21 19.65 6.59 2.97 30.06 -2.87 2.39 28.12 0.43 2.22
Notes and Sources: Taxes represent the proportion of taxes collected in percentage of GDP; ∆(p.p.) represents the change, in percentual points between decades. The
GDPpc variable represents the annual average growth rate of per capita GDP between decades. Regarding to the Taxes variable, we use the ratio between government
revenue and GDP data of Mitchell (1998) for France, Germany (West Germany for the years between 1950 and 1990) and United Kingdom. For the United States case
we collected data from Mitchell (1983) for the years between 1800 and 1910. From 1920 to 1990 we use the data presented in Piketty (2014). It is important to mention
that for the four previous countries, sometimes there is a lack of data regarding GDP. In those cases we made use of Gross National Product data. For Portugal, there
are several data sources. Tax revenues: 1840-1910 based in Cardoso and Lains (2010); 1920-1990: Sousa (2012); Gross Domestic Product statistics based in Valério
(2001)). Since economic years did not match with calendar years between 1915 and 1935 - economic years started at 1st July of a calendar year and ended at 30th
June of the following year -, we calculate the tax revenues of a given calendar year as the arithmetic mean of tax revenues of economic years which overlap the calendar
year (eg. tax revenues regarding 1920 is computed throughout the average of tax revenues of economic years 1919-20 and 1920-21 years). The data for per capita GDP
growth rate variable was collected from Bolt and van Zanden (2014).
20
References
Alt, J. E. (1983). The Evolution of Tax Structures. Public Choice, 41(1):181–222.
Amaral, L. (2012). Institutions, property, and economic growth: Back to the passage from
the Ancien Régime to liberalism in Portugal. Análise Social, 202(XLVII):28–55.
Bakija, J. and Steuerle, E. (1991). Individual Income Taxation Since 1948. National Tax
Journal, 44(4):451–475.
Barnes, L. (2011). The Impact of Trade on Direct Taxation, 1870-1914.
Baysinger, B. and Tollison, R. (1980). Chaining Leviathan: the case of Gladstonian finance.
History of Political Economy, 12(2):206–213.
Bernardi, L. and Profeta, P. (2004). Tax Systems and Tax Reforms in Europe. Routledge,
London, United Kingdom.
Biagini, E. F. (1991). Popular Liberals, Gladstonian finance, and the debate on taxation,
1860-1874. In Biagini, E. F. and Reid, A. J., editors, Currents of Radicalism: Popular
Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850–1914, chapter 7, pages
134–162. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Bolt, J. and van Zanden, J. L. (2014). The Maddison Project: collaborative research on
historical national accounts. The Economic History Review, 67(3):627–651.
Bonney, R. (1999). The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, 1200-1815. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1 edition.
Bonney, R. (2010). The Apogee and Fall of the French Renier Regime, 1801-1914. In
Cardoso, J. L. and Lains, P., editors, Paying for the Liberal State: The Rise of Public
Finance in Nineteenth-Century Europe, chapter 3, pages 81–102. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, United Kindom.
Brauer, C. M. (1982). Kennedy, Johnson, and the War on Poverty. The Journal of
American History, 69(1):98–119.
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. M. (2000). The Power to Tax, volume 9 of Collected Works
of James M. Buchanan. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, United States.
Brownlee, W. E. (2004). Federal Taxation in America: A Short History. Cambridge
University Press, New York, United States, 2 edition.
Cardoso, J. L. and Lains, P. (2010). The Public Finance in Portugal, 1796-1910. In
Cardoso, J. L. and Lains, P., editors, Paying for the Liberal State: The Rise of Public
Finance in Nineteenth-Century Europe, chapter 9, pages 251–278. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, United Kindom.
21
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de Macedo, J. B., Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, and de Sousa, R. M. (2006). War, Taxes, and
Gold: The Inheritance of the Real. In Bordo, M. D. and Cortés-Conde, R., editors,
Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old to the New World: Monetary and Fiscal
Institutions in the 17th through the 19th Centuries, chapter 6, pages 187–228. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
do Rosario Correia, M., Neck, R., Panagiotidis, T., and Richter, C. (2008). An empir-
ical investigation of the sustainability of the public deficit in Portugal. International
Economics and Economic Policy, 5(1):209–223.
Dormois, J.-P. (2004). The French Economy in the Twentieth Century. New studies in
economic and social history 49. Cambridge University Press, New York, United States.
Elmendorf, D. W., Liebman, J. B., Wilcox, D. W., Feldstein, M., Penner, R. G., and
Rubin, R. (2002). Fiscal Policy. In Frankel, J. and Orszag, P., editors, American
Economic Policy in the 1990s, chapter 2, pages 61–138. MIT Press, Cambridge, United
States.
22
Esteves, R. P. (2003). Looking ahead from the past: The intertemporal sustainability of
Portuguese finances, 1854-1910. European Review of Economic History, 7(2):239–266.
Esteves, R. P. (2005). Finanças Públicas. In Lains, P. and Álvaro Ferreira da Silva,
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